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I propose a reconceptualization of key phenomena important in the study of emotion—those phenomena that
reflect functions and circuits related to survival, and that are shared by humans and other animals. The
approach shifts the focus from questions about whether emotions that humans consciously feel are also
present in other animals, and toward questions about the extent to which circuits and corresponding func-
tions that are present in other animals (survival circuits and functions) are also present in humans. Survival
circuit functions are not causally related to emotional feelings but obviously contribute to these, at least indi-
rectly. The survival circuit concept integrates ideas about emotion, motivation, reinforcement, and arousal in
the effort to understand how organisms survive and thrive by detecting and responding to challenges and
opportunities in daily life.Introduction
Emotion is a major research growth area in neuroscience and
psychology today. A search of PubMed citations for the 1960s
yields just over 100 papers with the word ‘‘emotion’’ in the title.
With each subsequent decade, small increases resulted, until
the last decade, when emotion titles grew exponentially—more
than 2,000 hits. Emotion has happened.
But what exactly is it that has happened? What is being
studied in all these papers on emotion? Actually, the term
‘‘emotion’’ is not well defined in most publications. Perhaps
this is not surprising since there is little consensus about what
emotion is, and how it differs from other aspects of mind and
behavior, in spite of discussion and debate that dates back to
the earliest days in modern biology and psychology (e.g., Dar-
win, 1872; James, 1884; Cannon, 1927, 1931; Duffy, 1934,
1941; Tomkins, 1962; Mandler, 1975; Schachter, 1975; Ekman,
1980, 1984, 1992; Izard, 2007; Frijda, 1986; Russell, 2003;; Ek-
man and Davidson, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998,
2000, 2005; Rolls, 1999, 2005; Damasio, 1994, 1999; Leventhal
and Scherer, 1987; Scherer, 2000; Ortony and Turner, 1990; O¨h-
man, 1986, 2009; Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1989; Ellsworth,
1994; Zajonc, 1980; Lazarus, 1981, 1991a, 1991b; Barrett,
2006a, 2006b; Barrett et al., 2007; Kagan, 2007; Prinz, 2004;
Scarantino, 2009; Griffiths, 2004; Ochsner and Gross, 2005;
Lyons, 1980).
One point that many writers on this topic accept is that, while
there are unique features of human emotion, at least some
aspects of human emotion reflect our ancestral past. This
conclusion is the basis of neurobiological approaches to
emotion, since animal research is essential for identifying
specific circuits and mechanisms in the brain that underlie
emotional phenomena.
Progress in understanding emotional phenomena in the brains
of laboratory animals has in fact helped elucidate emotional
functions in the human brain, including pathological aspects of
emotion. But what does this really mean? If we don’t have an
agreed-upon definition of emotion that allows us to say whatemotion is, and how emotion differs from other psychological
states, how can we study emotion in animals or humans, and
how can we make comparisons between species?
The short answer is that we fake it. Introspections from
personal subjective experiences tell us that some mental states
have a certain ‘‘feeling’’ associated with them and others do not.
Those states that humans associate with feelings are often
called emotions. The terms ‘‘emotion’’ and ‘‘feeling’’ are, in
fact, often used interchangeably. In English we have words like
fear, anger, love, sadness, jealousy, and so on, for these feeling
states, and when scientists study emotions in humans they typi-
cally use these ‘‘feeling words’’ as guideposts to explore the
terrain of emotion.
The wisdom of using common language words that refer to
feelings as a means of classifying and studying human
emotions has been questioned by a number of authors over
the years (e.g., Duffy, 1934, 1941; Mandler, 1975; Russell,
1991, 2003; Barrett, 2006a, 2006b; Kagan, 2007; Griffiths,
1997; Rorty, 1980; Dixon, 2001; Zachar, 2006). Whatever prob-
lems might arise from using feeling words to study human
emotion, the complications are compounded many fold when
such words are applied to other animals. While there are
certainly emotional phenomena that are shared by humans
and other animals, introspections from human subjective expe-
rience are not the best starting point for pursuing these. How,
then, should the aspects of emotion relevant to animals and hu-
mans alike be pursued?
In answering this question it is important to separate the
phenomena of interest from the overarching concept of emotion.
One set of such phenomena includes responses that occur when
an organism detects and responds to significant events in the
course of surviving and/or maintaining well-being—for example,
responses that occur when in danger or when in the presence of
a potential mate or in the presence of food when hungry or drink
when thirsty. These are fundamental phenomena that have
always interested animal behavior scientists, and would be of
interest even if the terms ‘‘emotion’’ and ‘‘feelings’’ neverNeuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 653
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the relation of the phenomena to the field of emotion without re-
defining them as fundamentally emotional phenomena, and thus
infusing the phenomena with confusing implications.
In this Perspective I, therefore, describe a way of conceiving
phenomena important to the study of emotion, but with minimal
recourse to the terms emotion or feelings. The focus is instead on
circuits that instantiate functions that allow organisms to survive
and thrive by detecting and responding to challenges and oppor-
tunities. Included, at a minimum, are circuits involved in defense,
maintenance of energy and nutritional supplies, fluid balance,
thermoregulation, and reproduction. These survival circuits and
their adaptive functions are conserved to a significant degree
in across mammalian species, including humans. While there
are species-specific aspects of these functions, there are also
core components of these functions that are shared by all
mammals.
By focusing on survival functions instantiated in conserved
circuits, key phenomena relevant to emotions and feelings are
discussed with the natural direction of brain evolution in mind
(by asking to what extent are functions and circuits that are
present in other mammals also present in humans) rather than
by looking backward, and anthropomorphically, into evolu-
tionary history (by asking whether human emotions/feelings
have counterparts in other animals).
Emotion, motivation, reinforcement, and arousal are closely
related topics and often appear together in proposals about
emotion. Focusing on survival functions and circuits allows
phenomena related to emotion, motivation, reinforcement, and
arousal to be treated as components of a unified process that
unfolds when an organism faces a challenge or opportunity.
What follows is not an attempt at explaining or defining
emotion. Instead, the aim is to offer a framework for thinking
about some key phenomena associated with emotion
(phenomena related to survival functions) in a way that is
not confounded by confusion over what emotion means. Step-
ping back from the overarching concept of emotion and
focusing instead on key phenomena that make emotion an
interesting topic may be the best way out of the conceptual
stalemate that results from endless debates about what
emotion is.
Why Do We Need to Rethink the Relation of Emotion
to Survival?
The relation of innate survival functions to emotions is hardly
novel, and goes back at least to Darwin (1872). As a result, neuro-
scientists have long assumed that specific emotional/motiva-
tional circuits are innately wired into the brain by evolution, and
that these mediate functions that contribute to survival and
well-being of the organism (e.g., Cannon, 1929; MacLean,
1949, 1952; Hess, 1954; Stellar, 1954; von Holst and von Saint-
Paul, 1962; Flynn, 1967; Olds, 1977; Siegel and Edinger, 1981;
Panksepp, 1982, 1998, 2005; Blanchard and Blanchard, 1972;
Bolles and Fanselow, 1980; Damasio, 1994, 1999; Berridge,
1999; McNaughton, 1989; Swanson, 2000; Ferris et al., 2008;
Choi et al., 2005; Motta et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2011; O¨hman,
2009). That certain emotions are wired into the brain is also a
major tenet of evolutionary psychology (e.g., Tooby and Cos-654 Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.mides, 1990; Pinker, 1997; Nesse, 1990). If many researchers in
the field (past and present) believe this, why dowe need to bother
with another discussion of the topic?
Amajor controversy in the field of emotion research today is, in
fact, about the issue of whether there are innate emotion circuits
in the human brain. This debate is centered on the question of
whether emotions are ‘‘natural kinds,’’ things that exist in nature
as opposed to being inventions (constructions) of the human
mind (e.g., Panksepp, 2000; Griffiths, 2004; Barrett, 2006a;
Izard, 2007; Scarantino, 2009). Much of the discussion is
focused the question of whether so-called ‘‘basic emotions’’
are natural kinds. Basic emotions are those that are said to be
universally expressed and recognized in people around the
world, conserved in our close animal ancestors, and supposedly
hard-wired into brain circuits by evolution (Darwin, 1872; Tom-
kins, 1962; Ekman, 1972, 1980, 1984, 1992, 1999a, 1999b; Izard,
1992, 2007; Damasio, 1994, 1999; Panksepp, 1998, 2000, 2005;
Prinz, 2004). Contemporary theories recognize between five and
seven of these basic or primary emotions. Ekman’s list of six
basic emotions is the canonical example (Ekman, 1972) and
includes fear, anger, happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise.
This list of putative hard-wired basic emotions in fact serves as
the foundation for much research on the neural basis of
emotional functions in the human brain—a recent review uncov-
ered 551 studies between 1990 and 2008 that used Ekman’s
basic emotions faces or variants of these to study functional
activity related to emotion in the human brain (see Fusar-Poli
et al., 2009).
In spite of beingwell known andwidely applied in research, the
basic emotions point of view has been challenged on various
grounds (e.g., Averill, 1980; Ortony and Turner, 1990; Russell,
1980, 2003; Barrett, 2006a; Barrett et al., 2007). For one thing,
different theories have different numbers of basic emotions,
and even different names for similar emotions. In addition, ques-
tions have been raised about the methods used to identify basic
emotions (e.g., forced choice rather than free labeling of the
emotion expressed in a face). Basic emotions theory has also
been challenged on the basis of a lack of coherence of the
phenomena that constitute individual emotions, and the diversity
of states to which a given emotion label can refer. Others argue
that emotions, even so-called basic emotions, are psycholog-
ical/social constructions, things created by the mind when
people interact with the physical or social environment, as
opposed to biologically determined states. Also relevant is the
fact that themain basic emotions theory based on brain research
in animals (Panksepp, 1998, 2005) lists emotions that do not
match up well with those listed by Ekman or others as human
basic emotions.
Of particular relevance here is Barrett’s recent challenge to
the natural kinds status of basic emotions, and particularly to
the idea that the human brain has evolutionarily conserved
neural circuits for basic emotions (Barrett, 2006a; Barrett
et al., 2007). Her argument is centered on several points: that
much of evidence in support of basic emotions in animals is
based on older techniques that lack precision (electrical brain
stimulation), that basic emotions identified in animals do not
map onto the human categories, and that evidence from human
imaging studies show that similar brain areas are activated in
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disagree with Barrett’s conclusion that the similarity of functional
activation in different emotions is an argument against basic
emotions since imaging does not have the resolution necessary
to conclude that the similarity of activation in different states
means similar neural mechanisms. Yet, I concur with her conclu-
sion that the foundation of support for the idea that basic
emotions, as conventionally conceived, have dedicated neural
circuits is weak. This does not mean that the mammalian brain
lacks innate circuits that mediate fundamental phenomena rele-
vant to emotion. It simply means that emotions, as defined in the
context of human basic emotions theory, may not be the best
way to conceive of the relevant innate circuits. Enter survival
circuits.
Survival Circuits
It has long been known that the body is a highly integrated
system consisting of multiple subsystems that work in concert
to sustain life both on a moment to moment to basis and over
long time scales (Bernard, 1878–1879; Cannon, 1929; Lashley,
1938; Morgan, 1943; Stellar, 1954; Selye, 1955; McEwen,
2009; Damasio, 1994, 1999; Pfaff, 1999; Schulkin, 2003). Amajor
function of the brain is to coordinate the activity of these various
body systems. An important category of life-sustaining brain
functions are those that are achieved through behavioral interac-
tions with the environment. As noted, these survival circuits
include, at a minimum, circuits involved in defense, maintenance
of energy and nutritional supplies, fluid balance, thermoregula-
tion, and reproduction.
Survival circuits have their ultimate origins in primordial mech-
anisms that were present in early life forms. This is suggested by
the fact that extant single-cell organisms, such as bacteria, have
the capacity to retract from harmful chemicals and to accept
chemicals that have nutritional value (Macnab and Koshland,
1972). With the evolution of multicellular, and multisystem, eu-
karyotic organisms (Metazoa, or what we usually call animals),
fundamental survival capacities increase in complexity and
sophistication, in large part due to the presence of specialized
sensory receptors and motor effectors, and a central nervous
system that can coordinate bodily functions and interactions
with the environment (Shepherd, 1988).
The brains of vertebrate organisms vary in size and
complexity. Yet, in spite of these differences, there is a highly
conserved organizational plan that is characteristic of all verte-
brate brains (Nauta and Karten, 1970; Northcutt and Kaas,
1995; Swanson, 2002; Butler and Hodos, 2005; Striedter,
2005). This conservation is most often discussed in terms of
central sensory and motor systems. However, sensory motor
systems do not exist in isolation, and in fact evolved to negotiate
interactions with the environment for the purpose of sustaining
life—for example, by maintaining energy and fluid supplies,
regulating body temperature, defending against harm, and
enabling reproduction.
The survival circuits listed do not align well with human basic
emotions. However, my goal is not to align survival circuits
with basic emotion categories. It is instead to break free from
basic emotion categories based on human emotional feelings
(introspectively labeled subjective states) and instead let con-served circuits do the heavy lifting. For example, there is no
anger/aggression circuit in the present scheme. This might at
first seem like a striking omission. However, it is important to
note that aggression is not a unitary state with a single neural
representation (Moyer, 1976; Chi and Flynn, 1971; Siegel and
Edinger, 1981). Distinct forms of aggression (conspecific,
defensive, and predatory aggression) might be more effectively
segregated by the context in which the aggression occurs:
defense circuitry (aggression in an attempt to protect one’s self
from harm); reproductive circuitry (aggression related to compe-
tition for mates); feeding circuitry (predatory aggression toward
prey species). Similarly, a joy/pleasure/happiness kind of circuit
is not listed and might seem like a fatal flaw. However, behaviors
used to index joy/ pleasure/happiness are instead treated prod-
ucts of specific circuits involved in energy and nutrition, fluid
balance, procreation, thermoregulation, etc. By focusing on the
subjective state, joy/pleasure/happiness, emotion theories
tend to gloss over the underlying details of emotional processing
for the sake of converging on a single word that symbolizes
diverse underlying states mediated by different kinds of circuits.
Each survival circuit may itself need to be refined. For
example, it is unlikely that there is a single unified defense or
reproductive circuit. The range of functions studied needs to
be expanded to more effectively characterize these. Some
variations on defense are described below, but still other refine-
ments may be needed.
Another key difference between the survival circuit and basic
emotions approaches is this. Basic emotion circuits are meant
as an explanation of the feelings for which each circuit is said
to be responsible. Survival circuits are not posited to have any
direct relation (causal role) in feelings. They indirectly influence
feelings, as described later, but their function is to negotiate
behavioral interactions in situations in which challenges and
opportunities exist, not to create feelings.
Survival circuits help organisms survive and thrive by orga-
nizing brain functions. When activated, specific kinds of
responses rise in priority, other activities are inhibited, the brain
and body are aroused, attention is focused on relevant environ-
mental and internal stimuli, motivational systems are engaged,
learning occurs, and memories are formed (e.g., Morgan,
1943; Hebb, 1949; Bindra, 1969; Gallistel, 1980; Scherer, 1984,
2000; Maturana and Varela, 1987; LeDoux, 2002).
In sum, survival circuits are sensory-motor integrative devices
that serve specific adaptive purposes. They are tuned to detect
information relevant to particular kinds of environmental chal-
lenges and opportunities, and they use this information to control
behavioral responses and internal physiological adjustment that
help bring closure to the situation. All complex animals (inverte-
brates and vertebrates) have survival circuits. Core components
of these circuits are highly conserved in vertebrates. I focus on
vertebrates, especially mammals in this article, but consider
the relation of invertebrate to vertebrate survival functions
toward the end.
Nature and Nurture in Survival Circuits
Survival circuits detect key trigger stimuli on the basis of innate
programming or past experience. By innate programming I
mean genetically specified synaptic arrangements that areNeuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 655
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make possible species-wide stimulus-response connections
that allow organisms to respond to specific stimulus patterns
in tried and true ways (i.e., with hard-wired/innate reactions)
that have been honed by natural selection.
By experience I mean conditions under which associations are
formed between novel stimuli and biologically innately significant
events, typically innate triggers. These experience-dependent
associations allow meaningless stimuli that occur in conjunction
with significant events to acquire the ability to activate the innate
response patterns that are genetically wired to innate trigger
stimuli. The fact that the response patterns are innately wired
and initially expressed involuntarily does not mean that they
are completely inflexible. Not only can they be coupled to novel
stimuli through experience and learning, they can be regulated in
terms of their time course and intensity, and perhaps in other
ways.
Innate and experience-based evaluative mechanisms are, as
noted, circuit-specific. Thus, defense, nutritional, reproductive,
thermoregulatory and other survival systems are wired to detect
unique innate triggers. By entering into associations with biolog-
ically significant stimuli, novel sensory events become learned
triggers that activate survival circuits. We will consider innate
and learned survival circuit triggers in the context of defense
next. In the field of emotion, these are described as uncondi-
tioned and conditioned fear stimuli.
Defense as an Example
The evidence for conservation across mammals of mechanisms
underlying survival functions such as defense (e.g., LeDoux,
1996, 2012; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Motta et al., 2009; Choi
et al., 2005; Kalin et al., 2004; Amaral, 2003; Antoniadis et al.,
2007), reproduction (e.g., Pfaff, 1999; Oomura et al., 1988;
Blaustein, 2008), thermoregulation (Nakamura and Morrison,
2007), fluid balance (Johnson, 2007; Fitzsimons, 1979), and
energy/nutritional regulation (Elmquist et al., 2005; Morton
et al., 2006; Saper et al., 2002) is strong. Space does not permit
a detailed discussion of these circuits and their functions.
Defense circuits in mammals will be used as an initial illustration.
Defense against harm is a fundamental requirement of life. As
noted above, even single-cell organisms can detect and respond
to harmful environmental stimuli. In complex organisms (inverte-
brates and vertebrates), threat detection involves processing of
innate and learned threats by the nervous system via transmis-
sion of information about the threat through sensory systems
to specialized defense circuits.
Unconditioned threat stimuli are species-specific. The most
common threat triggers are stimuli that signal other animals
(predators and potentially harmful conspecifics), and these will
obviously be different for different species. Examples of innately
wired stimuli for rodents include predator odors (e.g., Motta
et al., 2009; Pagani and Rosen, 2009; Blanchard et al., 1990),
as well as high-frequency predator warning sounds emitted by
conspecifics (e.g., Litvin et al., 2007; Choi and Brown, 2003),
high-intensity auditory stimuli (e.g., Bordi and LeDoux, 1992),
and bright open spaces (Thompson and LeDoux, 1974; Gray,
1987; Walker and Davis, 2002). In primates, the sight of snakes
and spiders has an innate propensity to trigger defense (Amaral,656 Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.2003; O¨hman, 1986; Mineka and O¨hman, 2002). In spite of being
genetically specified, innate stimulus processing is nevertheless
subject to epigenetic modulation by various factors inside and
outside the organism during development, and throughout life
(Bendesky and Bargmann, 2011; Monsey et al., 2011; McEwen
et al, 2012; Brown and Hariri, 2006; Casey et al., 2011; Zhang
et al., 2004). Indeed, some aspects of defense stimulus process-
ing in primates, including humans, involves preferential rapid
learning to certain classes of innately ‘‘prepared’’ stimuli (Selig-
man, 1971; O¨hman, 1986; Mineka and O¨hman, 2002). Fearful
and aggressive faces of conspecifics are also a potent innate
defense trigger in humans and other primates (Adolphs, 2008;
Davis et al., 2011).
Recent studies have revealed in some detail the circuits that
allow rodents to respond to unconditioned threats, especially
odors that signal predators or potentially dangerous conspe-
cifics (Dielenberg et al., 2001; Canteras, 2002; Petrovich et al.,
2001; Markham et al., 2004; Blanchard et al., 2003; Motta
et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2005; Vyas et al., 2007; Pagani and
Rosen, 2009) (Figure 1). The odors are detected by the vomero-
nasal olfactory system and sent to the medial amygdala (MEA),
which connects with the ventromedial hypothalamus (VMH).
Outputs of the latter reach the premammillary nucleus (PMH)
of the hypothalamus, which connects with dorsal periaqueductal
gray (PAGd). But not all unconditioned threats are signaled by
odors. Unconditioned threats processed by other (nonolfactory)
modalities involve sensory transmission to the lateral amygdala
(LA) and from there to the accessory basal amygdala (ABA),
which connects with the VMH-PM-PAGv circuitry (Motta et al.,
2009). Different subnuclei of the MEA, PMH, and PAGd are
involved in processing conspecific and predatory threats.
In the case of both olfactory and nonolfactory unconditioned
threat signals, the PAGd and its outputs to motor control areas
direct the expression of behavioral responses that help promote
successful resolution of the threatening event. The PAG is also
involved in detection of internal physiological signals that trigger
defensive behavior (Schimitel et al., 2012).
Biologically insignificant stimuli acquire status as threat
signals results when they occur in conjunction with biologically
significant threats. This is called Pavlovian defense conditioning,
more commonly known as fear conditioning. Thus, a meaning-
less conditioned stimulus (CS) acquires threat status after
occurring in conjunction with an aversive unconditioned stim-
ulus (US). Most studies of Pavlovian defense conditioning
involve the use of electric shock as the biologically significant
US, though other modalities have been used as well. Typically,
auditory, visual, or olfactory stimuli as the insignificant CS. While
a strong US can induce learning to most kinds of sensory stimuli,
associability is not completely promiscuous—for example, taste
stimuli associate more readily with gastric discomfort than with
electric shock (Garcia et al., 1968). Once the association is
formed, the CS itself has the ability to elicit innate defense
responses.
The neural circuit by which a CS (auditory, visual, olfactory)
elicits innate defense responses, such as freezing behavior,
involves transmission of sensory inputs to the LA, intra-amyg-
dala connections (direct and indirect) linking the LA with the
central nucleus of the amygdala (CEA), and connections from
Figure 1. Circuits Underlying Defense Reactions Elicited by Unconditioned (Unlearned) and Conditioned (Learned) Threats
Abbreviations: ABA, accessory basal amygdala; BA, basal amygdala; CEA, central amygdala; LA, lateral amygdala; LH, lateral hypothalamus; MEA, medial
amygdala; NAcc, nucleus accumbens; VMH, ventromedial hypothalamus; PAGd, dorsal periaqueductal gray region; PAGv, venral periaqueductal gray region;
PMH, premammilary nucleus of the hypothalamus.
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sen et al., 2011; LeDoux, 2000; Maren, 2001; Fanselow and
Poulos, 2005; Davis et al., 1997; Rosenkranz and Grace, 2002;
Cousens and Otto, 1998; Pare´ et al., 2004; Maren and Quirk,
2004; Quirk and Mueller, 2008; Haubensak et al., 2010). The
indirect connections between LA and CEA include the basal
(BA), AB, and intercalated (ITC) nuclei (Pitka¨nen et al., 1997;
Pare´ et al., 2004). As with unconditioned threats, PAG outputs
to motor control regions direct behavioral responses to the
threat. While damage to the PAGvl disrupts defensive freezing
behavior, lesions of the PAGdl enhance freezing (De Oca et al.,
1998), suggesting interactions between these regions. Whether
the CEA and PAG might also be linked via the VMH or other
hypothalamic nuclei has not been carefully explored.
While most studies have focused on freezing, this behavior
mainly occurs in confined spaces where escape is not possible
(Fanselow, 1994; Blanchard et al., 1990; de Oca et al., 2007;
Canteras et al., 2010). Little work has been done on the neural
basis of defense responses other than freezing that are elicited
by a conditioned cues (but see de Oca and Fanselow, 2004).An important goal for future work is to examine the relation of
circuits involved in innate and learned behavior. Electric shock
simulates tissue damage produced by predator-induced
wounds. However, it is difficult to trace the unconditioned stim-
ulus pathways with this kind of stimulus. Recent studies
exploring interactions between circuits processing olfactory
conditioned and unconditioned stimuli is an important newdirec-
tion (Pavesi et al., 2011).
Another form of Pavlovian defense conditioning involves the
association between a taste CS and a nausea-inducing US.
The circuits underlying so called conditioned taste aversion
also involve regions of the amygdala, such as CEA and the baso-
loateral complex (which includes the LA, BA, and ABA nuclei), as
well as areas of taste cortex (Lamprecht and Dudai, 2000).
However, the exact contribution of amygdala areas to learning
and performance of the learned avoidance response is less clear
than for the standard defense conditioning paradigms described
above.
While much of the work on threat processing has been con-
ducted in rodents, many of the findings apply to other species.Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 657
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conditioned threats in rodents appear to function similarly in
rabbits (Kapp et al., 1992) and nonhuman primates (Kalin et al.,
2001, 2004; Antoniadis et al., 2007). Evidence also exists for
homologous amygdala circuitry in reptiles (Martı´nez-Garcı´a
et al., 2002; Davies et al., 2002; Bruce andNeary, 1995) and birds
(Cohen, 1974). In addition, functional imaging and lesion results
from humans (e.g., Phelps, 2006; Damasio, 1994, 1999; LaBar
and Cabeza, 2006; Whalen and Phelps, 2009; Bu¨chel and Dolan,
2000; Mobbs et al., 2009; Schiller and Delgado, 2010) show that
the amygdala plays a key role in defense conditioning, and thus
suggest that, at least to a first approximation, similar circuits are
involved in humans as in other mammals. However, the level of
detail that has been achieved in humans pales in comparison
to the animal work. Methods available for studying humans
are, and are likely to continue to be, limited to levels of anatom-
ical resolution that obscure circuit details.
Because animal research is thus essential for relating detailed
structure to function in the brain, it is extremely important that the
phenomena of interest be conceptualized in a way that is most
conducive to understanding the relation of findings from animal
research to the human condition. Survival circuits provide such
a conceptualization.
Interactions between Survival Circuit Functions
Survival circuits interact to meet challenges and opportunities.
Indeed, survival functions are closely intertwined (e.g., Saper,
2006). In the presence of a threat to survival or well-being, the
brain’s resources are monopolized by the task of coping with
the threat. Other activities, such as eating, drinking, and sex,
are actively suppressed (Gray, 1987; Lima and Dill, 1990;
Blanchard et al., 1990; Fanselow, 1994; Choi et al., 2005).
However, increased behavioral activity of any kind (fighting,
fleeing, foraging for food or drink, sexual intercourse) expends
energy, depleting metabolic resources. At some point, the
need to replenish energy rises in priority and overrides defen-
sive vigilance, which might otherwise keep the animal close to
home. Foraging for food or liquids often requires exposure to
threats and a balance has to be struck between seeking the
needed resources and staying put. Metabolic activity during
any active behavior (whether fighting, feeding, foraging, forni-
cating) produces heat that has to be counteracted by lowering
body temperature. Thermoregulation is controlled directly by
homeostatic alterations that include increased sweating or pant-
ing, and by various behavioral means, such as altering fluid
intake or seeking shelter. We cannot consider all possible
interactions between survival circuits here. Thus, interactions
between the energy/nutritional regulation system and the
defense system will be discussed in some detail for illustrative
purposes.
Across mammalian species, circuits involving the arcuate,
ventromeidal, dorsomedial, and lateral hypothalamus, and regu-
lated by leptin, ghrelin, glucose, and insulin, control feeding in
relation to energy and nutritional demands (Elmquist et al.,
2005; Morton et al., 2006; Saper et al., 2002; Saper, 2006). In
satisfying nutritional/energy demands, behavioral responses
are guided by the sensory properties of potential food sources
and by cues associated with food. For example, auditory or658 Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.visual cues that occur in connection with food items can modu-
late the energy/nutritional circuitry (e.g., Petrovich, 2011).
Specifically, areas of the amygdala (LA, BA, ABA) process these
learned cues associated with food and relay them to the LH.
Such cues, if sufficiently potent, can stimulate eating in animals
that are sated.
Feeding does not occur in a vacuum. As noted above, when
threat levels rise, feeding is suppressed (Gray, 1987; Lima and
Dill, 1990; Blanchard et al., 1990; Fanselow, 1994). For example,
a tone previously paired with shock inhibits feeding (Petrovich,
2011) and food-motivated instrumental behavior (e.g., Cardinal
et al., 2002). Connections from the basolateral amygdala to the
LH facilitate feeding by a CS associated with food, while the
suppression of feeding by an aversive CS involves outputs of
the CEA. The exact target remains to be determined but CEA
connects with LH both directly and indirectly (Petrovich et al.,
1996; Pitka¨nen et al., 1997). While threat processing normally
trumps feeding, at some point the risk of encountering harm is
balanced against the risk of starvation. A similar case can be
made for the suppression of other behaviors by threat process-
ing. For example, medial amygdala areas that process threat
related odors suppress reproduction via connections to VHM
reproductive circuits (Choi et al., 2005).
The fact that the amygdala contributes to appetitive states
(e.g., Rolls, 1999, 2005; Everitt et al., 1999, 2003; Gallagher
and Holland, 1994; Holland and Gallagher, 2004; Cardinal
et al., 2002; Baxter and Murray, 2002; Moscarello et al., 2009)
as well as defense (see above) does not mean that the amygdala
processes food and threat related cues in the same way. Simi-
larly, the fact that both appetitive and aversive stimuli activate
the amgydala in fMRI studies (e.g., Canli et al., 2002; Hamann
et al., 2002; Lane et al., 1999) does not mean that these stimuli
are processed the same by the amygdala. Recent unit recording
studies in primates show that appetitive and aversive signals are
processed by distinct neuronal populations of cells in the lateral/
basal amygdala (Paton et al., 2006; Belova et al., 2007; Belova
et al., 2008; Morrison and Salzman, 2010; Ono and Nishijo,
1992; Rolls, 1992, 1999, 2005). Molecular imaging techniques
with cellular resolution show that similarities in activation at the
level of brain areas obscures differences at the microcircuit level
(Lin et al., 2011).
Circuit Functions versus Behavioral Responses
Because different groups of mammals faced different selective
pressures, the behavioral responses controlled by conserved
survival circuits can differ. As ethologists have long noted, many
survival-related behaviors are expressed in species-specific
ways (e.g., Tinbergen, 1951; Lorenz, 1981; Manning, 1967).
Consider escape from a threat. We’ve seen evidence for
conserved defense circuits across mammals and even across
vertebrates, but behavioral responses controlled by these
circuits can differ dramatically. For example, while most
mammals flee on all fours, some use only two legs (humans),
others escape by flying (bats), and still others by swimming
(whales, seals, and walrus). Similarly, sexual and feeding
behavior, while largely conserved at the neural system level, is
also expressed behaviorally in diverse ways within mammals.
For example, although androgen activity in the hypothalamus
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varies in males, in part because of different approaches required
given the configuration of the male and female body (e.g., Pfaff,
1999). This is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the
lordosis posture of female rats. The male cannot insert his penis
into the vaginal cavity of a female unless she arches her back to
adopt this posture, which is regulated by the binding of estrogen
during the fertile phase of her cycle (Pfaff, 1999; Blaustein, 2008).
Further, somemammals use their snouts when eating and others
their paws/hands, but the core circuits described above never-
theless regulate the various homeostatic and behavioral func-
tions required to regulate energy and nutritional supplies.
Thus, the responses used by survival circuits to achieve
survival goals can be species-specific even though the circuit
is largely species-general (obviously, there must be some differ-
ences in circuitry, at least in terms of motor output circuitry for
different kinds of behaviors, but the core circuit is conserved).
By focusing on the evolved function of a circuit (defense, repro-
duction, energy and nutrition maintenance, fluid balance, ther-
moregulation), rather than on the actual responses controlled
by the circuit, a species-independent set of criteria emerge for
defining brain systems that detect significant events and control
responses that help meet the challenges and opportunities
posed by those events.
Information Processing by Survival Circuits:
Computation of Stimulus Significance
A key component of a survival circuits is a mechanism for
computing circuit-specific stimulus information. Adefense circuit
needs to be activated by stimuli related to predators, potentially
harmful conspecifcs, and other potential sources of harm, and
not be triggered by potential mates or food items. The goal of
such computational networks is to determine whether circuit-
specific triggers are present in the current situation, and, if
a trigger is detected, to initiate hard-wired (innate) responses
that are appropriate to the computed evaluation. Such responses
are automatically released (in the ethological sense—see Tinber-
gen, 1951; Lorenz, 1981; Manning, 1967) by trigger stimuli.
The nature of behavioral responses released by survival
circuit triggers shouldbebrieflydiscussed.Activationofa survival
circuit elicits behavioral responses on the spot in some cases
(e.g., in the presence of defense triggers) but in other cases
unless the goal object (sexual partner, food, drink) is immediately
present, the more general effect is the alteration of information
processing throughout the brain in such a way as to mobilize
resources for bringing the organism into proximity with suitable
goal objects and thus dealing with the opportunity or challenge
signaled by the trigger. We will consider a number of different
consequences of survival circuit activation below.Here,we focus
on information processing related to trigger detection.
Above we briefly noted the species-specific nature of innate
trigger stimuli. While the original idea of the ethologists focused
on complex Gestalt configural stimuli and pattern recognition,
simpler features are now emphasized. Thus, a rat can recognize
a predator (cat, fox) by specific chemical constituents of pred-
ator odors (Wallace and Rosen, 2000; Vyas et al., 2007; Dielen-
berg et al., 2001; Markham et al., 2004; Blanchard et al., 2003)
and does not have to recognize the predator as a complexperceptual pattern. Moreover, humans can recognize certain
emotions by the eyes alone and do not need to process the
face as a whole (e.g., Whalen et al., 2004), and evidence exists
that this can be handled subcortically (Liddell et al., 2005; Morris
et al., 1999; Tamietto et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2007). These find-
ings are consistent with the notion that that relatively simple
sensory processing by subcortical areas can provide the requi-
site inputs to structures such as the amygdala, bypassing or
short-circuiting cortical areas (LeDoux, 1996). In contrast to
innate trigger stimuli, learned triggers are less restricted by
species characteristics. Thus, many (though not all, as noted
above) stimuli can be associatedwith harm and become a trigger
of defense circuits later.
In the field of emotion, the term automatic appraisal is some-
times used when discussing how significant stimuli elicit so-
called emotional responses automatically (without deliberate
control), and is contrasted with cognitive or reflective appraisal,
where processing that is deliberate, controlled and often
conscious, determines stimulus meaning and predisposes
actions (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Bowlby, 1969; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus,
1991a, 1991b; Leventhal and Scherer, 1987; Lazarus and Folk-
man, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Scherer, 1988; Scherer
et al., 2001; Sander et al., 2005; Jarymowicz, 2009).
The stimulus significance evaluations by survival circuits are
obviously more in line with automatic, unconscious appraisal
mechanisms. However, while stimulus evaluations by survival
circuits is clearly an example of automatic appraisal, one should
not be too quick to assume that what psychologists refer to as
automatic appraisals in humans is identical to survival circuit pro-
cessing.The latter probably refers toanarrowersetof phenomena
than the former, at least in humans, if not other species, though
the range of phenomena in question clearly overlap.
Multiple Roles of Innate and Learned Stimuli
So far we’ve seen that unconditioned and conditioned emotional
stimuli can be thought of in other terms, as unconditioned and
conditioned survival circuit triggers. In addition, though, they
can also be described as incentives—stimuli that motivate
instrumental behavior. The same stimuli additionally function
as reinforcers—stimuli that strengthen the probability that an
instrumental response will be learned and later performed. Moti-
vation and reinforcement are obviously closely aligned with the
topic of emotion, though these are often studied separately
today. Let’s look more closely at how closely intertwined these
processes are to one another (Figure 2).
Consider a tone that is paired with food. This is a typical
method used to study positive emotional states in animals. The
tone in other words is an appetitive Pavlovian CS that elicits
innate approach behavior. However, it is also a survival circuit
trigger, as it can stimulate eating, even in satiated rats, by acti-
vating hypothalamic circuits involved in energy management
(Petrovich, 2011). The same CS will also function as a condi-
tioned incentive that can modulate instrumental behaviors
(in contrast to the ability of a CS to elicit Pavlovian innate (uncon-
ditioned approach) behaviors. Thus, a CS associated with food
will facilitate performance of an instrumental response that is
also maintained by food (e.g., bar-pressing for food) (Corbit
and Balleine, 2005; Cardinal et al., 2002; Balleine and Killcross,Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 659
Figure 2. Multiple Roles for a Conditioned
Stimulus
A CS functions as a survival circuit trigger (by activating
a specific survival circuit related to the US that was used
during conditioning), and as a conditioned incentive and
a conditioned reinforcer (by way of connections from the
survival circuit to motivational and reinforcement
systems). Other routes by which a CS might influence
motivational and reinforcement circuitry are not shown.
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value of the Pavlovian CS is transferred to (alters performance of)
the instrumental response. The degree of transfer depends in
part on the similarity of the US in the Pavlovian and instrumental
tasks. A tone CS can also be used to reinforce the learning of
a new instrumental response (e.g., Holland and Rescorla,
1975). Thus, a hungry rat will learn to press a bar simply to
receive the tone CS. In this case the tone is considered a rein-
forcer, a second-order or conditioned reinforcer (a first order or
primary reinforcer would be something like food itself rather
than a stimulus associated with food).
Similar relations hold for a tone paired with an aversive US,
footshock. The tone CS elicits innate freezing behavior (see
above) and is thus often described as a conditioned emotional
stimulus (conditioned fear stimulus in this case). And just as an
appetitive CS enhances bar pressing for food, and aversive CS
suppresses food-maintained bar pressing (Estes and Skinner,
1941; Hammond, 1970; Cardinal et al., 2002; Balleine and Kill-
cross, 2006). However, an aversive CS will also facilitate perfor-
mance of an aversively motivated behavior (Hammond, 1970;
La´zaro-Mun˜oz et al., 2010). Further, just as rats will learn to
perform new instrumental responses for the sole reward of
receiving an appetitive CS, they will also learn new instrumental
responses that are rewarded by the elimination of an aversive CS
(e.g., Cain and LeDoux, 2007).
Although we’ve focused on multiple roles of CSs a similar
argument can be made for USs. These are simply stimuli that
innately activate survival circuits, promote the performance of
consummatory responses (food is eaten, sex is consummated)
in their presence, or support Pavlovian associative conditioning
or instrumental conditioning.
If we choose, we can thus describe a variety of the effects of
so-called ‘‘emotional’’ stimuli without the use of the adjective660 Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.‘‘emotional.’’ These are innate or learned stimuli
that activate survival circuits and trigger the
expression of the innate responses controlled
by these circuits, that modulate the perfor-
mance of learned (previously reinforced) instru-
mental behaviors, and that lead to the reinforce-
ment of new instrumental behaviors (Table 1).
Motivation in the Survival Circuit Scheme
Emotion and motivation were traditionally
treated as separate topics. Emotion was viewed
as a reaction (e.g., a fearful, angry, disgusted,
joyful, or sad emotional reaction) to some envi-
ronmental situation, and motivation as a drive
from within (e.g., hunger, thirst, or sexual drive)(e.g., Hull, 1943; Stellar, 1954). In the late 1960s, the emergence
of the concept of incentives helped bring these together (Bindra,
1969; Trowill et al., 1969). Bindra (1969), for example, argued that
emotion, like motivation, is influenced by internal factors (e.g.,
hormones) and motivation, like emotion, is impacted by external
stimuli (incentives).
Motivation, as assessed behaviorally, involves approach
toward desired outcomes and avoidance of undesired outcomes
(Tolman, 1932; McClelland et al., 1953; Schneirla 1959, Elliot and
Church, 1997; Cofer, 1972; Cofer and Appley, 1964; Miller, 1944;
Trowill et al., 1969; Bindra, 1969; Davidson, 1993; Gray, 1982;
Lang et al., 1990; Berridge, 2004; Cardinal et al., 2002; Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998; Holland and Gallagher, 2004; Gallagher
and Holland, 1994; Everitt and Robbins, 2005). So-called
approach/avoidance motivation often occurs in two stages: an
anticipatory/exploratory/search for goal objects and the perfor-
mance and consummatory responses (innate responses con-
trolled by surivial circuits) once goal objects are in reach (Sher-
rington, 1906; Tinbergen, 1951; Cardinal et al., 2002; Berridge,
1999, 2007).
The anticipatory/exploratory/search phase is guided by incen-
tives (Bindra, 1968; Trowill et al., 1969; Balleine and Dickinson,
1998; Cardinal et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2009; Petrovich
et al., 2002; Berridge, 1999, 2007, 2004; Rolls, 1999, 2005;
Glimcher, 2003). Incentives, as noted, are essentially innate or
conditioned emotional stimuli; in other words, stimuli with the
potential to activate survival circuits.
One of the key discoveries that led to the rise of incentive
views was that stimuli that lacked the ability to satisfy needs
and reduce drives (for example, the nonnutritive sugar substi-
tute saccharin) were nevertheless motivating (Sheffield and
Roby, 1950; Cofer, 1972). A major consequence was that the
connection between motivation and specific functional circuits
Table 1. Multiple Roles for So-Called ‘‘Emotional’’ Stimuli
1. Survival Circuit Trigger Stimulus Activates a specific survival circuit
Innate (Unconditioned) trigger Elicits innate responses to stimuli without the need for prior exposure to the stimulus and
mobilizes other brain resources to deal with the opportunity or challenge presented
by the innate trigger
Learned (Conditioned) trigger Potentially elicits innate responses to stimuli after being associated (via Pavlovian
conditioning) with an innate trigger; more generally, mobilizes brain resources to deal
with the challenge or opportunity signaled by the learned trigger
2. Incentive Modulates instrumental goal-directed behavior to help meet the opportunity or challenge
signaled by the stimulus that is triggering activation of a specific survival circuit
Innate (unconditioned or primary) incentive Increases approach toward or avoidance of the stimulus in an effort to resolve the
challenge or opportunity present
Learned (conditioned or secondary) incentive Invigorates and guides behavior toward situations where the challenge or opportunity
present can be resolved
3. Reinforcer Supports the learning of Pavlovian or instrumental associations
Innate (unconditioned or primary) reinforce Induces the formation of associations with neutral stimuli that occur in its presence
(through Pavlovian conditioning) and to the formation of associations with responses
that lead to the presentation (appetitive stimuli) or removal (aversive stimuli) of the
stimulus (through instrumental conditioning)
Learned (conditioned or second-order) reinforce Induces formation of associations with other stimuli (through Pavlovian second-order
conditioning) or with goal directed responses (through second-order instrumental
conditioning)
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sized. Motivation became a somewhat generic process by
which behavior was invigorated and guided toward goals by
incentives.
The nucleus accumbens emerged as a key focal point of
this general motivational system (Graybiel, 1976; Mogenson
et al., 1980; Balleine and Killcross, 1994; Killcross and Rob-
bins, 1993; Everitt et al., 1999; Cardinal et al., 2002; Ikemoto
and Panksepp, 1999; Parkinson et al., 1999; Koob, 2009; Sesack
and Grace, 2010; Berridge, 2007, 2009; Berridge and Robin-
son, 1998; Hyman et al., 2006; Nestler, 2004; Kelley, 2004).
Behavioral invigoration or energization was said to be a func-
tion of dopamine release in the accumbens and incentive pro-
cessing by the accumbens was thought to guide behavior
toward goals. Other areas involved in incentive motivation,
such as the obrbito-frontal cortex, are not considered here
(see Rolls, 1999, 2005).
A key question is whether motivation is a generic process or
whether motivationally specific processing by survival circuits
might be significant as well. While there may indeed be generic
aspects of motivation (e.g., behavioral invigoration), evidence
also supports motivationally specific information processing
as well. At the behavioral level, bar pressing for food by
a hungry obtain food is facilitated by a conditioned incentive
that signals food, is facilitated less by one that signals water
and is inhibited by one that signals shock (Corbit and Balleine,
2005; Hammond, 1970), indicating that motivation is tied to
specific survival functions. Lateral hypothalamic circuits that
control energy maintenance through feeding modulate nucleus
accumbens activity (Sears et al., 2010). The accumbens, once
thought to be mainly involved in processing appetitive stimuli,
is now know to contribute to the processing of aversive incen-
tives as well (Salamone, 1994; Schoenbaum and Setlow, 2003;
Roitman et al., 2005; Reynolds and Berridge, 2008). Within theaccumbens information processing segregated along motiva-
tional lines—aversive and appetitive stimuli are processed
separately at the cellular and molecular level (Roitman et al.,
2005, 2008). While most work is at the level of appetitive versus
aversive states, it would be important to determine whether
incentives related to different appetitive survival circuits (e.g.,
incentives related to food versus sex) are processed sepa-
rately.
Once incentives have guided the organism to goal objects,
innate consummatory responses, which are specific to the
particular survival circuit and function, are initiated. Their termi-
nation essentially ends the survival (emotional) episode—food
is eaten, liquid is drunk, sex is consummated, safety is reached.
Before leaving the topic of motivation of instrumental goal-
directed behavior it is important to mention that such behaviors,
when repeatedly performed in recurring situations, can become
habitual and divorced from the actual attainment of the goal. In
such cases of stimulus-response habit formation, the neural
control switches from the ventral to the dorsal striatum (Everitt
and Robbins, 2005;Wickens et al., 2007; Packard and Knowlton,
2002).
Reinforcement and Survival Circuits
Reinforcement and motivation are closely related. Things that
motivate are often reinforcing, and vice versa. Like motivation,
reinforcement was once linked to drive states (Hull, 1943), but
drifted toward generic mechanisms over the years. The
discovery that behavior could be reinforced by electrical stimu-
lation of brain areas (Olds and Milner, 1954), and findings that
electrical reinforcement could summate with different natural
reinforcers (Coons and White, 1977; Conover and Shizgal,
1994), were compatible with a generic mechanism of reinforce-
ment. Similarly, that addictive drugs and natural or electrical rein-
forcers interact (Wise, 2006) is also consistent with a genericNeuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 661
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forcement (e.g., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto,
1987) explained learning with singular learning rules. Themodern
paradigmatic example of a generic reinforcement mechanism is
the role of dopamine in the striatum as a reward prediction error
signal (Schultz, 1997).
Nevertheless, there have from time to time been calls for
linking reinforcement more directly to specific neurobiological
systems. For example, Glickman and Schiff (1967) proposed
that reinforcement is a facilitation of activity in neural systems
that mediate species-specific consummatory acts. In other
words, they proposed a link between reinforcement and motiva-
tionally-specific survival circuits. It is therefore of great interest
that recent work on the role of dopamine as a reward pre-
diction error signal is beginning to recognize the importance
of specific motivational states in modulating the effects of
dopamine as a reward prediction error signal (Schultz, 2006;
Glimcher, 2011).
The expression of reinforcement as a change in the probability
that an instrumental response will be performed may well occur
via a generic system in which the reinforcer strengthens the
response (e.g., via contributions of dopamine in the striatum to
reward prediction errors). But, in addition, survival circuit-
specificmotivational information is likely to contribute at a funda-
mental level, providing the stimulus with the motivational value
that allows it to ultimately engage the more generic mechanisms
that strengthen instrumental responses and that motivate their
performance.
Reinforcement principles have been used by some authors to
classify emotional states (e.g., Gray, 1982; Rolls, 1999, 2005;
Cardinal et al., 2002; Hammond, 1970; Mowrer, 1960). In these
models various emotions defined in terms of the presentation
or removal of reinforcers. Mowrer (1960), for example, proposed
a theory in which fear, hope, relief, and disappointment were ex-
plained in these terms. Later authors have attempted to account
for more conventional emotions (fear, sadness, anger, pleasure,
etc) as products of the presentation or removal of reinforcement.
This approach suffers from some of the same problems as basic
emotions theory in that it focuses on common language words
related to human feelings as the way to identify emotion mecha-
nisms in the brain. Perhaps reinforcement, like motivation, might
be fruitfully linked to emotional phenomena through the survival
circuit conception.
Survival Circuits and Arousal
Survival circuits are engaged in situations in which challenges
and/or opportunities exist, in other words what we commonly
call emotional or motivated situations. So far we have focused
on two major consequence of survival circuit activation. One
is the elicitation of specific kinds of hard-wired behavioral
reactions. The second is an increase in the probability that instru-
mental goal-directed actions relevant to the opportunity or chal-
lenge will be learned (reinforced) and performed (motivated)—or,
if the situation has been experienced by the individual repeatedly
in the past, stimulus-response habits may substitute for incen-
tive guided instrumental goal-directed action.
A third consequence of survival circuit activation is ‘‘general-
ized arousal’’ (Moruzzi and Magoun, 1949; Lindsley, 1951;662 Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.Schober et al., 2011; Lang, 1994; Pfaff et al., 2008). As originally
conceived, generalized arousal was a function of the brainstem
reticular activating system (Moruzzi andMagoun, 1949; Lindsley,
1951). Later, the undifferentiated reticular activating system
concept gave way to the notion that distinct populations of
chemically specific neurons that underlie sleep-wake cycles
and the degree of arousal, attention, and vigilance while awake
(Jouvet, 1969, 1999; Steriade, 1995, 2004; Jacobs et al., 1990;
Jones, 2003; Aston-Jones, 2005; Monti and Jantos, 2008; Sarter
et al., 2005; Arnsten and Li, 2005; Robbins, 2005; Nieuwenhuys,
1985; Nishino, 2011). Specifically, neurons that synthesize and
release biogenic amines (norepinephrine, dopamine, serotoinin,
or acetylcholine) and peptides (e.g., orexins) are believed to
make significant contributions to brain arousal. While these
transmitters are released in widespread areas of the brain, their
effects are especially profound on neurons that are actively
engaged in information processing (Aston-Jones et al., 1991;
Foote et al., 1983, 1991; Aston-Jones and Bloom, 1981). That
is, they modulate rather than initiate neural activity, regulating
neuronal excitability and neurotransmission (Schildkraut and
Kety, 1967; Hasselmo, 1995; Lopez and Brown, 1992). Also
contributing to generalized arousal are peripheral systems that
release hormones into the circulation (e.g., cortisol released
from the adrenal cortex, adrenergic hormones, epinephrine
and norepinephrine, from the adrenal medulla; and others) (Axel-
rod and Reisine, 1984; McEwen, 2009; Sapolsky et al., 1986).
Cortisol crosses the blood brain barrier and binds to receptors
in a variety of areas, while adrenergic hormones affect the CNS
indirectly (McGaugh, 2000). The modulatory effects of central
modulators are relatively rapid, whereas the effects of peripheral
hormones are considerably slower, allowing the prolongation of
the survival state for extended periods of time.
Generalized arousal has played a key role in a number of theo-
ries of emotion over the years (e.g., Duffy, 1941; Lindsley, 1951;
Schachter and Singer, 1962; Schachter, 1975; Schildkraut and
Kety, 1967; Mandler, 1975; Lang, 1994; Robbins, 1997) and is
also important in contemporary dimensional theories of emotion
(Russell, 1980, 2003; Russell and Barrett, 1999) and some neural
models of emotion (e.g., Davis andWhalen, 2001; Gallagher and
Holland, 1994; Kapp et al., 1994; Lang and Davis, 2006).
However, it is important to ask how generalized arousal is trig-
gered in emotional situations, and how the arousal, once
present, affects further processing. Again, the defense circuit
is useful for illustrative purposes.
The detection of a threat by defense circuits of the amygdala
leads to the activation of central neuromodulatory and peripheral
hormonal systems (see Gray, 1993; LeDoux, 1992, 1995; Davis,
1992; Rodrigues et al., 2009). Thus, central amygdala outputs
target dendritic areas of norpeiphrine, dopamine, serotonin,
and acetylcholine containing neurons and cause these to release
their chemical products in widespread brain areas (e.g., Reyes
et al., 2011; Gray, 1993; Weinberger, 1995; Kapp et al., 1994).
Central amygdala outputs also target neurons that activate the
sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, which
releases adrenergic hormones from the adrenal medulla, and
the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, which releases cortisol
from the adrenal cortex (Gray, 1993; Talarovicova et al., 2007;
Loewy, 1991; Reis and LeDoux, 1987). Threats thus not only elicit
Figure 3. Consequences of Survival Circuit
Activation
When a survival circuit trigger activates a survival circuit,
a number of consequences follow. (1) Innate behavioral
responses are potentially activated, as well as autonomic
nervous system (ANS) responses and hormonal
responses. These each generate feedback to the brain. (2)
Neuromodulator systems are activated and begin to
regulate excitability and neurotransmission throughout the
brain. (3) Goal-directed instrumental behavior is initiated
by the motivation system. (4) Sensory, cognitive, and
explicit memory systems are also affected, leading to
enhanced attention to relevant stimuli and the formation of
new explicit memories (memories formed by the hippo-
campus and related cortical areas) and implicit memories
(memories formed within the survival circuit).
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in the brain and body. Body feedback has played an important
role in emotion theory for more than a century (James, 1884;
Lange, 1885/1922; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Tomkins,
1962; Adelmann and Zajonc, 1989; Buck, 1980; Damasio,
1994, 1999).
One consequence of this pattern of connectivity is that
central and peripheral arousal signals facilitate processing in
the survival circuit that triggered the activation of arousal.
This establishes a loop in which continued activation of the
survival circuit by external stimuli produces continued activa-
tion of the modulator release, which in turn facilitates the ability
of external stimuli to continue to drive the survival circuit.
Indeed, modulators facilitate activity in sensory processing
areas (e.g., Hurley et al., 2004), which should enhance attention
to external stimuli present during survival circuit activation.
Modulators also facilitate processing areas involved in re-
trieving forming, and storing memories (McGaugh, 2003; Roo-
zendaal et al., 2009). All of these effects are recapitulated in
motivational circuits once the initial reaction begins to give
way to goal-directed instrumental actions. For example, dopa-
mine contributes to the invigoration or activation of behavior
during the exploratory search phase of a motivated state (Ber-
ridge 2004; Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Robbins and Everitt,
2007). Norepinephrine, serotoin, acetylcholine, orexins and
other modulators also contribute. While arousal is often dis-
cussed in terms of generic (generalized) mechanisms, the
possibility that some aspects of arousal might be survival
circuit specific should also be explored (Pfaff et al., 2008;
Schober et al., 2011).NeuroGlobal Organismic States
Survival circuit activation leads to the triggering
of arousal responses in the CNS and to the
potential expression of innate behaviors (de-
pending on the circumstances), as well as
expression of autonomic nervous system and
hormonal responses in the body. Behavioral,
autonomic, and endocrine responses feedback
to the brain and also contribute to arousal. In
addition, motivational systems are activated,
potentially leading to goal-directed behaviors
(Figure 3). The overall result of survival circuit-specific activity, motivational activity, and generalized arousal
is the establishment of a state in which brain resources are coor-
dinated and monopolized for the purpose of enhancing the
organism’s ability to cope with a challenge and/or benefit from
opportunities. The organism becomes especially attentive to
and sensitive to stimuli relevant to the survival function, memo-
ries relevant to the survival function are retrieved, and previously
learned instrumental responses relevant to the survival function
are potentiated. New learning occurs and new explicit memories
(via the hippocampus and related cortical areas) and implicit
memories (memories stored in the survival circuit) are formed.
Such states will be referred to here as global organismic states.
The fact that these states are global does not mean that they
completely lack specificity. They include survival circuit-specific
components, as well as general motivational components that
control instrumental behavior and components that control
nonspecific or generalized arousal within the brain and body.
The notion that emotional and motivated states have pro-
found effects on the brain, recruiting widespread areas into
the service of the immediate situation, monopolizing and/or
synchronizing brain resources, has been proposed previously
(Gallistel, 1980; Maturana and Varela, 1987; Scherer, 2000;
LeDoux, 2002, 2008). Particularly relevant is the ‘‘central motive
state’’ hypothesis (Morgan, 1943; Hebb, 1949; Bindra, 1969).
Yet, the exact nature of global organismic states is poorly under-
stood. In part this is likely attributable to the lack of techniques
for assessing neural activity across widespread areas of the
brain at a sufficiently detailed level of resolution. Measurement
of BOLD activity in the brains of humans or animals with fMRI
allows whole brain analysis of functional activity, but lacksn 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 663
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ular markers, such as the expression of immediate early gene
activity, in relation to behavior holds promise. Particularly impor-
tant would be the development of techniques that could provide
widespread simultaneous assessment of changes in body phys-
iology and brain activation and related to survival circuit pro-
cessing, general-purpose motivational processing, and general-
ized arousal.
Transcending Neuroanatomical Homology: Survival
throughout the Animal World
Invertebrates do not have the same conserved circuits that
vertebrates have. However, they face many of the same prob-
lems of survival that vertebrates do: they must defend against
danger, satisfy energy and nutritional needs, maintain fluid
balance and body temperature, and reproduce. As in verte-
brates, specific circuits are associated with such functions,
though different invertebrates have different nervous systems
and different circuits.
The fact that invertebrate nervous systems are diverse and
differ from the canonical vertebrate nervous system does not
mean the invertebrates are irrelevant to understanding survival
functions (and thus so-called emotional behavior) in vertebrates.
Much progress is being made in understanding innate behaviors
related to survival functions such as defense, reproduction and
arousal in invertebrates such as Drosophila (Wang et al., 2011;
Lebestky et al., 2009; Dickson, 2008) and C. elegans (McGrath
et al., 2009; Pirri and Alkema, 2012; Garrity et al., 2010; Bende-
sky et al. 2011). In these creatures, as in mammals and other
vertebrates, G protein-coupled receptors and their regulators
play key roles in modulating neuronal excitability and synaptic
strength, and in setting the threshold for behavioral responses
to incentives associated with specific motivational/emotional
states (Bendesky and Bargmann, 2011). Biogenic amines and
their G protein-coupled receptors also play a key role in arousal
and behavioral decision making in Drosophila (Lebestky et al.,
2009) and C. elegans (Bendesky et al., 2011) as in vertebrates
(see above), and genetic mechanisms underlying survival-based
learning in invertebrates. For example, such as in Aplysia cali-
fornica many of the neurotransmitters (e.g., glutamate), neuro-
modulators (e.g., serotonin, dopamine), intracellular signals
(e.g., protein kinase A, map kinase), transcription factors (e.g.,
cyclic AMP response element binding protein) involved in
defense conditioning Aplysia (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2006; Kandel,
2001; Carew and Sutton, 2001; Glanzman, 2010; Mozzachiodi
and Byrne, 2010) have been implicated in defense conditioning
in the mammalian amygdala (see Johansen et al., 2011). Further,
studies in Drosophila have implicated some of the same intracel-
lular signals and transcription factors in defense-based learning
(Dudai, 1988; Yovell et al., 1992; Yin and Tully, 1996; Margulies
et al., 2005).
Similarities at the cellular and molecular level, and presumably
at the level of genes that encode these processes, across
diverse groups of animals is impressive evidence for conserved
principles of organization underlying survival functions. How-
ever, an important question is whether there might be more
fundamental circuit principles that are instantiated at the micro-
circuit level in nervous systems that are superficially distinct. If664 Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.so, the key to understanding the relation of survival functions
across invertebrates and vertebrates is likely to involve con-
served principles of organization at the microcircuit level rather
similarity of anatomical structures or molecules (David Ander-
son, personal communication). Very interesting examples are
emerging from studies of olfactory processing, for which analo-
gies in behaviorally relevant peripheral odor-encoding and
central representation occur using similar organizational princi-
ples in anatomically distinct (nonhomologous) structures in
Drosophila and rodents (see Bargmann, 2006; Sosulski et al.,
2011; Wang et al., 2011).
Survival functions instantiated in specific neural circuits likely
reflect conserved neural principles. We should at least be
amenable to the possibility that defense, reproduction, and other
survival functions in humans, may be related to survival functions
in invertebrates. This notion is not likely to be surprising to card
carrying comparative neurobiologist, but might meet more
resistance from researchers who study humans since survival
functions account for some fundamental emotional functions in
humans, and in humans emotions are often equated with or
closely tied to feelings. But the thrust of what has been said
here is that survival functions should not be treated as qualita-
tively differently in humans and other mammals, in mammals
and other vertebrates, in vertebrates and invertebrates. As noted
earlier, a case can even be made that solutions to fundamental
problems of survival are in the final analysis derived from
solutions to these problems present primordial single-cell
organisms.
Survival Circuits and Human Feelings: What Is An
Emotional State?
When the term ‘‘emotional state’’ is used, the user typically has
the notion of ‘‘feeling’’ in mind. This article is an attempt to rede-
fine the nature of such states, at least the components of such
states that are shared across mammalian species (and likely
across vertebrates, and to some extent in invertebrates as
well). Nevertheless, the history of emotion research and theory
is for the most part the history of trying to understand what feel-
ings are and how they come about. It is thus important to
comment on the nature of feelings and their relation to survival
circuits.
One might be tempted to conclude that global organismic
states, or at least the central representation of such sates,
constitute neural correlates of feelings. Global organismic states
make major contributions to conscious feelings but the two are
not the same. Global organismic states are part of the rawmate-
rial from which certain classes of feelings are constructed (those
feelings associated with survival circuit activation). But they
could, and likely do, exist, independent of feelings, at least in
relation to what humans call feelings. My proposal is that these
kinds of feelings (those associated with survival circuit activa-
tion) occur in humans when consciousness (1) detects that
a survival circuit is active or witnesses the existence of a global
organismic state initiated by the activation of a survival circuit
in the presence of particular kind of challenge or opportunity
and (2) appraises and labels this state. These are not the only
kinds of feelings that can occur in humans. Other kinds include
feelings associated with higher-order or social emotions (guilt,
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annoying itch).
What about other animals? To the extent that nonhuman
organisms have consciousness and cognition, capacities that
allow the observation, appraisal, and categorization of survival
circuit activity or global organismic states, they can have feelings
when survival circuit activity or global organismic states occur.
To the extent that the mechanisms of consciousness and cogni-
tion differ in different animals (with humans included as an
animal), and to the extent that the mechanisms underlying
survival circuit or global organismic states themselves differ,
feelings will be different. This leaves open the possibility that
conscious feelings can be present in other mammals, other
vertebrates, or even in invertebrates. But rather than engaging
in idle speculation about this, criteria can be offered that can
help address the question. Specifically, if we can understand
what underlies conscious feelings in humans, we can then
search for whether those mechanisms are present, and to
what extent they are present, in other animals.
This, you probably noticed, is a different approach from the
one advocated earlier for survival circuits. We now ask whether
processes in humans are present in other animals. But just as
the survival circuit question should be asked about whether
mechanisms in other animals are present in humans, the ques-
tion of whether mechanisms shown to be present in humans
are present in other animals seems only addressable in the
other direction. We can never know whether another animal
has conscious emotional feelings, but we might be able to
determine whether the mechanisms that make of conscious-
ness and feelings possible in humans also present in other
animals.
The fact is that the brain mechanisms that underlie conscious
emotional feelings in humans are still poorly understood.
However, this should not stand in the way of understanding
survival functions and the states that occur in the brain when
the circuits mediating survival functions are activated. There is
much work to be done even if we don’t have viable solutions to
the problems of conscious feelings.
Research on feelings is complicated because feelings cannot
be measured directly. We rely on the outward expression of
emotional responses, or on verbal declarations by the person
experiencing the feeling, as ways of assessing what that person
is feeling. This is true both when scientists do research on
emotions, and when people judge emotions in their social inter-
actions with one another.
When not wearing a scientific hat, most of us apply introspec-
tively based concepts to other animals. When a deer freezes to
the sound of a shotgun we say it is afraid, and when a kitten purrs
or a dog wags its tail, we say it is happy. In other words, we use
words that refer to human subjective feelings to describe our
interpretation of what is going on in the animal’s mind when it
acts in way that has some similarity to the way we act when we
have those feelings. Some authors also claim that similarity of
behavior is strongly suggestive of similarity at the level of subjec-
tive experience (Panksepp, 1998, 2005) or more generally that
humans know what an animal feels from observing its behavior
(Bekoff, 2007; Masson and McCarthy, 1996). But it’s hard to
justify anthropomorphic speculation in science. Panksepp hasattempted this (Panksepp, 1982; 1998, 2000; 2005), but few
scientists are convinced that this is the way to go, as there is no
way to objectively verify what another organism experiences.
So what’s the difference, if any, between attributing feelings to
other people and to other animals? There is a strong rationaliza-
tion for assuming all humans have subjectivemental states, such
as feelings, that are similar in kind. In the absence of genetic
mutations of the nervous system or acquired brain damage,
each human possesses the same basic kind of brain, a brain
with the same basic neural systems, as every other human. As
a result we expect that other people have the same kinds of basic
brain functions, and corresponding mental capacities, that we
have, and we can assume with some confidence that other
people experience the same kinds of feelings we do when we
they behave the way we behave when we have those feelings
(unless they are being intentionally deceitful). We can therefore
fairly comfortably apply our introspections about our own feelings
to themental states of other people on the basis of their behavior.
We should not, however, be so comfortable in talking about
the mental states of other species because their brains differ
from ours. A key question, of course, is whether their brains differ
from ours in ways that matter. In other words, do the brain areas
responsible for states of consciousness, such as feelings, differ
in humans and other animals?
There is considerable support for the idea that states of
consciousness are made possible, at least in part, through the
representation of experience in a cognitive workspace involving
neocortical areas, especially prefrontal and parietal cortical
areas (Crick and Koch, 1990, 2004, Dehaene and Changeux,
2004, Baars, 2005; Frith and Dolan, 1996; Frith et al., 1999; Frith,
2008; Shallice, 1988; Shallice et al., 2008). To the extent that
feelings are states of consciousness about emotional situations,
they should be represented in these cognitive workspace
circuits (LeDoux, 1996, 2002, 2008). The idea proposed here is
that conscious feelings result when global organismic states
are represented in the cognitive workspace. The basic ingredi-
ents of the global organismic state would include information
about the stimulus and other aspects of the social and physical
environment, the survival circuit the stimulus activates, CNS
arousal initiated by the survival circuit, feedback from survival
responses that are expressed in the body, and long-termmemo-
ries (episodic and semantic) about the stimulus and about the re-
sulting state (Figure 4). Thus, in the presence of a survival circuit
trigger (a.k.a. an emotional stimulus), the various ingredients
would be integrated, and the resulting state categorized by
matching the state with long-term memory stores. When this
occurs, a conscious feeling of the global organismic state begins
to exist. Such a state, having been categorized on the basis of
memories of similar states, could be dimensional in nature (just
based on arousal and valence) or could take on specific qualities
(could be more like what one felt when previously in danger than
when frustrated or when enjoying a tasty meal). Labeling of the
state with emotion words adds additional specificity to the expe-
rience, creating specific feelings (fear, pleasure, disgust, etc).
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a key component of the cogni-
tive workspace, is lacking in most other mammals, and is less
developed in nonhuman primates than in humans (Reep, 1984;
Braak, 1980; Preuss, 1995; Wise, 2008). In humans, granularNeuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 665
Figure 4. Ingredients of Feelings in a Cognitive Workspace
An emotional feeling is hypothesized to be a representation of a global
organismic state initiated by an external stimulus. The representation includes
sensory information about the stimulus and the social and physical context,
information about the survival circuit that is active, information about CNS
arousal, body feedback information, and mnemonic information about the
stimulus situation and the state itself. When such a global organismic state is
categorized and labeled a conscious feeling of a certain type (e.g. a feeling of
fear, pleasure, disgust, etc) results. To the extent that any of these components
differ in human and nonhuman species, the nature of the resulting state would
differ as well.
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et al., 2011). Given that feelings are a category of conscious
experience, the usual mechanisms of conscious experience
should be at work when we have emotional experiences (Le-
Doux, 1996, 2002, 2008). And given that some of the neural
mechanisms involved in conscious representations may be
different in humans and other animals, we should be cautious
in assuming that the subjectively experienced phenomena that
humans label as feelings are experienced by other animals
when they engage in behaviors that have some similarity to
human emotional behavior. In short, if the circuits that give rise
to conscious representations are different in two species, we
cannot use behavioral similarity to argue for similarity of
conscious feelings functionally. These observations add neuro-
biological substance to the point famously argued by the
philosopher Thomas Nagel. He proposed that only a bat can
experience the world like a bat, and only a human can experi-
ence the world like a human (Nagel, 1974). We should resist
the inclination to apply our introspections to other species.
Also, given that humans are the only organisms with natural
language, and language allows a unique mode of information
processing in the human brain, we need to be very cautious
when we make assumptions about nonhuman behavior
regarding processes that language affects. While the idea that
language affects thought and conscious experience (Whorf,
1956) was out of favor for a while, it has reemerged as an impor-
tant principle in recent times (Lakoff, 1987; Lucy, 1997). One way
that language is important is that it allows the semantic catego-
rization of experience, including emotional experience. For
example, there are more than 30 words in English for gradations
of fear (fear, panic, anxiety, worry, trepidation, consternation,
etc.) (Marks, 1987). The human brain may be able to categorize666 Neuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.emotional states in broad strokes without language but it is
unlikely that specific emotions (fear, anger, sadness, joy) could
come about without words. Accordingly, lacking language and
emotion words, an animal brain cannot partition emotional expe-
rience in this way. In short, the language of emotion likely
contributes to the experiences one has in emotional situations
(Schachter, 1975; Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1989; Scherer,
1984; Reisenzein, 1995). Indeed, different cultures and their
languages express emotions differently (Kitayama and Markus,
1994; Wierzbicka, 1994; Averill, 1980). The dimensional theory
of emotion views emotion words as markers in a multidimen-
sional semantic space of feelings (Russell, 1980; Russell and
Barrett, 1999). The dimensional theory is incompatible with
a basic emotions view, since the latter argues that feelings asso-
ciated with basic emotions are due to hard-wired circuits, but is
compatible with the survival circuit view, which posits indirect
and nonobligatory, as opposed to casual, links between survival
circuits and feelings.
But the impact of language goes far beyond simple semantics
and labeling. We use syntactic processes to evaluate the logical
truth of propositional statements. While not all human thought
involves propositional statements and logic, syntactic process-
ing provides the human brain and mind with unique features
and advantages. Through syntax, the human mind can simulate
who will do what to whom in a social situation instantaneously
rather than having to learn by trial and error.
Sowhat thenmight a bat or a rat experience without the kind of
cerebral hardware that is characteristic of the human brain?
Some have proposed that in addition to full blown feelings that
humans talk about,more basic, less differentiated feelings (crude
states of positive or negative valence, or maybe even somewhat
finer categories based on memory of feelings from the past in
similar situations) may exist in other animals. Such states have
been called core affects (Panksepp, 1998, 2005; Damasio.
1994, 1999; Barrett et al., 2007; Russell, 2003). While we cannot
ask other animals about their feelings, studies of humans can
begin to unravel how such states are experienced. Similarity of
the structure of these circuits in animals might then provide
insight into their function in other animals (Panksepp, 1998,
2005), provided that we do a good job of clarifying the function
of the circuits in question (see survival circuit discussion above).
Consciousness and feelings are topics that are best studied in
humans. Research on the neural basis of feelings in humans is in
its infancy (Panksepp, 1998; 2005; Damasio, 2003; Damasio
et al., 2000; Ochsner et al., 2002; Barrett et al., 2007; Rudrauf
et al., 2009; Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007). We will
never know what an animal feels. But if we can find neural corre-
lates of conscious feelings in humans (and distinguish them from
correlates of unconscious emotional computations in survival
circuits), and show that similar correlates exists in homologous
brain regions in animals, then some basis for speculating about
animal feelings and their nature would exist. While such specula-
tions would be empirically based, they would nevertheless
remain speculations.
Future Directions of Research
There are many topics that need further exploration in the study
of emotional phenomena in the brain. The following list is meant
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exhaustive.
1. The circuits underlying defense in rodents is fairly well
characterized and provides a good starting point for fur-
ther advancement. An important first step is elucidation
of the exact relation between innate and learned defense
circuits. Paradigms should be devised that directly
compare circuits that are activated by innate and learned
cues of the same sensory modality and that elicit similar
behavioral defense responses (freezing, escape, attack,
etc). Comparisons should proceed in stepwise fashion
within a species, with variation in the stimulus and
response modalities (though mundane, systematic
studies are important).
2. More information is also needed regarding the manner in
which external stimuli function as defense triggers, incen-
tives, and reinforcers within defense circuits. Tasks
should be developed that can be readily applied across
species, but at the same time easily tailored to species-
specific factors. Further exploration of whether there
are different circuits for defense in different contexts
would also be useful.
3. How do innate and learned stimuli trigger, motivate and
reinforce behaviors in nondefense survival circuits?
What are the evaluative mechanisms that process such
stimuli within specific survival circuits (e.g., energy/nutri-
tion, fluid balance, reproduction, etc)? While incentives
and reinforcers have been studied extensively in the
context of generic appetitive processes, also of interest
is the relation of such stimuli to the specific survival circuit
on which they depend.
4. Can survival circuits be further differentiated? For
example, to what extent do different forms of defense
utilize different circuits? Beyond classifications based
on the sensory modality that detects threats and whether
the threat is learned or unlearned, are there different
circuits for threats related to conspecifics, predators, in-
gested substances, territory, etc. Similar questions
arises for each survival circuit category.
5. When a given brain area is involved in multiple survival
functions, an effort should be made to determine the
extent to which underlying cellular mechanisms might
make distinct contributions. For example, the LA and
BA and nucleus accumbens have been implicated in
defensive and appetitive behaviors. As noted above,
single unit recordings suggest some independence of
responses to aversive and appetitive stimuli in these
areas. However, questions remain. Do amygdala or ac-
cumbens cells simply encode positive and negative
valence or are they tied to more specific survival func-
tions? This is readily explored by examining cellular
responses to incentive stimuli related different forms of
appetitive motivation. For example, do the cells that
respond to incentives related to food, drink and repro-
duction overlap or are they survival-function specific?
Single unit recordings are often restricted to one or
a small number of brain areas. New molecular imagingtechniques are beginning to allow such differences to
be explored at the cellular level across the whole brain.
A recent study by Lin et al. (2011) showing distinct popu-
lations of cells in the ventromedial hypothalamus that
contribute to mating and intruder attack is a prime
example. Genetic tools can also be used to provide
more detailed information about connectivity, including
connectivity at the level of brain areas but also between
specific cell types. Such approaches have begun to be
used but systematic studies are needed.
6. It is generally assumed that circuits underlying defense,
energy, fluid balance, reproduction, thermoregulation,
and other survival functions interact, but this has been
not been studied to any significant degree. This is a
particularly important topic that is best pursued by
methods that allow evaluation of concurrent activity in
the multiple brain areas, such as fMRI in humans and
fMRI and molecular imaging in animals. Studies com-
paring activity patterns across the whole brain in
response processing signals related to various survival
circuit functions could provide very important informa-
tion, especially if animal and human projects use related
behavioral paradigms. If homologies are found at the level
of brain areas between humans and other mammals,
molecular imaging can be used in animal studies to
search for uniquemicrocircuits that differentiate between
functions and the cellular and synaptic level.
7. Techniques are needed to assess physiological activity
at the cellular level across thewhole brain and throughout
the body (global organismic states) in the presence of
biological significant stimuli (triggers of survival circuit
activity or motivating incentives,) and during the perfor-
mance of innate or learned survival responses as well
as goal directed responses. It will be especially useful
to develop analytic tools that will be able to separate
contributions that are survival circuit specific from more
general purpose mechanisms, such as nonspecific
arousal, and generic aspects of reinforcement and instru-
mental behavior control.
8. More comparative work is needed to elucidate similari-
ties and differences in survival functions and circuits
between various groups of vertebrates. Particularly
pressing are studies of non-mammalian vertebrates.
9. What is the relation of survival functions in invertebrates
to vertebrates? Are there conserved molecules or genes,
or conserved computational principles, that underlie
anatomically distinct kinds of circuits but that perform
similar survival functions in vertebrates and inverte-
brates?
10. Explorations of the mechanisms underlying conscious
emotional feelings in humans should be pursued more
vigorously, including full-blown conscious feelings (feel-
ings of fear, joy, sadness, shame, embarrassment) and
coarser conditions (pleasant or unpleasant feelings).
This information is important because feelings are such
a defining feature of human mental life. But in addition
with such information it will then be possible to ask if
the required mechanisms of a given kind of consciousNeuron 73, February 23, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 667
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nisms are present, the results would not allow the
conclusion that other animals have feelings that are
homologous with human feelings. However, such a re-
sult would at least provide a basis for saying whether
there is a physical possibility for such states in other
animals.Conclusion
The survival circuit concept provides a conceptualization of an
important set of phenomena that are often studied under the
rubric of emotion—those phenomena that reflect circuits and
functions that are conserved across mammals. Included are
circuits responsible for defense, energy/nutrition manage-
ment, fluid balance, thermoregulation, and procreation, among
others. With this approach, key phenomena relevant to the
topic of emotion can be accounted for without assuming that
the phenomena in question are fundamentally the same or
even similar to the phenomena people refer to when they use
emotion words to characterize subjective emotional feelings
(like feeling afraid, angry, or sad). This approach shifts the
focus away from questions about whether emotions that
humans consciously experience (feel) are also present in other
mammals, and toward questions about the extent to which
circuits and corresponding functions that are relevant to the
field of emotion and that are present in other mammals are
also present in humans. And by reassembling ideas about
emotion, motivation, reinforcement, and arousal in the con-
text of survival circuits, hypotheses emerge about how
organisms negotiate behavioral interactions with the environ-
ment in process of dealing with challenges and opportunities
in daily life.
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